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  1Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism?
Direct Evidence from the Israeli Electorate 
 
 
This paper relies on the variation of terror attacks across time and space as an instrument 
to identify the causal effects of terrorism on the preferences of the Israeli electorate. We 
find that the occurrence of a terror attack in a given locality within three months of the 
elections causes an increase of 1.35 percentage points on that locality’s support for the 
right bloc of political parties out of the two blocs vote. This effect is of a significant 
political magnitude because of the high level of terrorism in Israel and the fact that its 
electorate is closely split between the right and left blocs. Moreover, a terror fatality has 
important electoral effects beyond the locality where the attack is perpetrated, and its 
electoral impact is stronger the closer to the elections it occurs. Interestingly, in left-
leaning localities, local terror fatalities cause an increase in the support for the right bloc 
whereas terror fatalities outside the locality increase the support for the left bloc of 
parties. Given that a relatively small number of localities suffer terror attacks we 
demonstrate that terrorism does cause the ideological polarization of the electorate. 
Overall, our analysis provides strong empirical support for the hypothesis that the 
electorate shows a highly sensitive reaction to terrorism. 
  2Within the past few years terrorism has become a widespread phenomenon affecting 
numerous countries of the world. In this short period of time we have gained a significant 
understanding of some of the causes and forms of terrorism (Berrebi, 2007; Bueno de 
Mesquita 2005b; Krueger and Laitin 2003; Krueger and Maleckova 2003), as well as the 
strategies used by terror organizations in the pursuit of their goals (Benmelech and 
Berrebi 2007; Berman and Laitin 2005). However, we have, as of yet, but little 
knowledge regarding the consequences of terrorism. Clearly, a rigorous analysis of the 
effects of terrorism on the targeted populations is vital to reach a comprehensive 
understanding of political violence. Moreover, it has important implications for the 
design of efficient policies aimed not only at curbing terrorism, but also at insulating the 
targeted population from heretofore unknown harmful side effects. 
The lack of a solid understanding based on sound empirical evidence is particularly 
acute regarding the political effects of terrorism on the targeted society. While there is a 
wide consensus that terrorism is mostly used to coerce governments to grant policy 
concessions, scholars disagree on its effectiveness. On the one hand, several studies 
claim that terrorism is rising around the world simply because it works (Pape 2003, 
2005). Other studies, on the contrary, argue that the claim above does not have 
substantial empirical support (Abrahms 2006). Most of the arguments put forward by 
scholars who claim that terrorism is effective, implicitly assume that the electorate shows 
a highly sensitive reaction to terrorism. Since in democracies the electorate may have the 
ability to influence policy, the voters' sensitivity to terrorism is the underlying 
mechanism that supposedly induces their leaders to grant concessions to terror factions.
1 
Although the assumption that voters' preferences are significantly affected by terrorism is 
of crucial importance to assess the effectiveness of terror campaigns, it has yet to be 
clearly established and quantified.
2 
                                                 
1 Pape (2003, 2005) argues that western democracies are particularly prone to suffer from terror 
campaigns because of the voters' sensitivity to terrorism. There is an ongoing debate about the 
validity of this claim. It has received empirical support in some studies (Krueger and Laitin 2003; 
Piazza 2006), but has been disputed by others (Abadie 2006; Jackson and Reiter 2007). Note that 
all the studies above are based on cross national data sets. They are not suitable, therefore, to 
examine whether or not voters' sensitivity to terror attacks plays a role in any correlation that we 
might observe between terrorism and political regime.   
2 Recent studies empirically established a correlation between terrorism (or the threat thereof) and 
the electorate's political preferences. This correlation was documented using data from Israel 
  3This study develops a specially designed econometric framework combined with a 
unique data set to carefully estimate the magnitude of the impact of terrorism on the 
electorate's preferences. We focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and use the variation 
of terror attacks across time and space as an instrument to identify the causal effects of 
terrorism on the voters’ political preferences. This approach helps us determine whether 
or not the sensitivity of the electorate to terrorism, i.e. the mechanism underlying the 
claim that terrorism is effective, is supported by the empirical evidence. 
A fundamental problem that arises in any attempt to quantify the effect of terrorism 
on the electorate's preferences is that the estimates obtained may be biased due to a 
plausible interaction between the two variables: terror attacks may influence the 
electorate's preferences, but terrorism may also be a reaction to those preferences. This 
interaction precludes researchers from identifying the impact of terrorism from other 
shocks to the voters' preferences by using only the variation across time. That is, an 
observed temporal correlation between terrorism and the electorate's preferences cannot 
be interpreted as a measure of the magnitude of the electoral effects of terrorism. Adding 
to the analysis the variation across space allows us to overcome the intrinsic difficulty of 
the task at hand. Note, however, that the variation across space would not be an 
appropriate instrument if terrorists condition the location of their attacks on the political 
preferences of the locality suffering the attack. In fact, such a strategy would imply that 
the causal relation is in the opposite direction. We use a falsification approach to dismiss 
this possibility. 
The results consistently document, across different empirical specifications, that 
terrorism causes an increase on the relative support for the right bloc of parties. Beyond 
establishing this fact, we provide a deeper analysis of the overall electoral effects of 
terrorism. We examine whether terrorism affects the mobilization of the electorate, and 
differentiate between two prominent theories of voting behavior that are consistent with 
the observed electoral effect of terrorism: policy voting (Kiewet 1981) and partisan 
voting (Powell and Whitten 1993). Additionally, this article uses the same empirical 
strategy to analyze whether terrorism brings about the ideological polarization of the 
electorate into two distinct political blocs. Our results suggest that terrorism causes an 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Berrebi and Klor 2006; Fielding and Penny 2006; Ludvigsen 2005; Sheafer 2004), Spain (Bali 
2007), and the U.S. (Davis and Silver 2004; Guilmartin 2004; Shambaugh and Josiger 2004). All 
these studies focus exclusively on the variation over time of the variables of interest and use time 
series analysis to elucidate any connection between terrorism and electoral preferences. 
  4increase in the support for the right bloc in all the localities with right-leaning 
preferences and a decrease in the support for the right bloc in most localities with left-
leaning preferences. Thus, by causing the polarization of the electorate, terrorism may 
not only affect the voters' preferences but appears to have other important structural 
effects on the political and social institutions of a targeted country. 
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
This section describes our main empirical strategy used to identify the causal effects of 
terrorism on voters’ political preferences. This strategy is based on a difference-in-
differences approach that uses the variation of terror fatalities across time and space in 
order to control for possible time or location specific effects. Specifically, this 
methodology allows us to estimate the causal effects of terrorism by comparing changes 
in consecutive electoral results of localities that suffered terror attacks (treated group) 
vis-à-vis changes in electoral results of localities that did not suffer from terror attacks 
(control group). The key identifying assumption of this approach is that, in the absence of 
terrorism, the trends of the electoral preferences of treated and control localities would be 
the same.
3   
Formally, the model we propose for the identification of the effect of terrorism on 
electoral outcomes can be specified as a fixed-effect linear regression model: 
 
(Right Bloc Share)i,t =  (Terror Fatalities)i,t +  (Total Fatalities)t +  Xi,t + μi +  i,t   (1) 
 
where (Right Bloc Share)i,t is the right-bloc share of the two-blocs vote in locality i in 
elections  t; (Terror Fatalities)i,t is the number of fatalities in locality i before the 
elections in t; (Total Fatalities)t is the total number of terror fatalities in Israel before 
elections t. Xi,t is a vector of political, socio-economic and demographic control variables 
that vary across localities and time. Finally, μi is a fixed effect unique to locality i. 
Note that the chosen econometric specification includes several variables that 
control for each locality's characteristics as well as a locality fixed effect. This is crucial 
since some of the locality's characteristics may be correlated simultaneously with higher 
                                                 
3 Importantly, unlike the traditional difference-in-differences approach, our methodology has the 
additional advantage of relying on an explanatory variable with differing treatment intensity 
across localities and elections. See Angrist and Pischke (2008, Chapter 5) for a thorough 
explanation of this methodology together with discussions of several applications. 
  5terror fatalities and higher support for the right bloc. Thus, omitting them could lead to 
spurious statistical correlations.
4 
The proposed econometric specification is intended to identify the value of  , the 
estimate of the local effect of terror fatalities on the voters' preferences. Since the model 
controls for the country-wide effect of terror fatalities, the parameter   captures only the 
effect of terror fatalities in locality i on the preferences of voters living in this locality. 
For example, if the number of terror fatalities in locality i increases by one, the share of 
the right bloc from the two party vote in this locality changes by  . 
We expect   to be positive according to some anecdotal evidence (Yediot Aharonot, 
January 10 2003) and a related theoretical analysis (Berrebi and Klor 2006). We believe 
that we may observe a local effect of terror fatalities for a variety of reasons. First, a 
terror attack triggers residents of a locality to alter their daily routine as a consequence of 
a change in their perceived personal security, affecting their attitude toward peace 
(Gordon and Arian 2001). Terror attacks may also impact the locality's economy and its 
residents' expected future income. These two effects may strongly antagonize the 
locality's residents and predispose them against any type of concessions to the Palestinian 
Authority. Second, the occurrence of a terror attack directly affects the salience of the 
conflict in the targeted locality, and may affect the probability that its residents attach to 
a peaceful solution to the conflict differently than in the other localities. This effect is 
amplified by the coverage of the local media (Sheafer, Dvir and Poran 2007).
5 If, on the 
other hand, the estimate of the local effect of terror fatalities on the voters' preferences is 
negative, this would provide direct empirical evidence in support of Pape's conclusions 
even in the very short run. That is, a negative estimate for   implies that terror attacks 
drive an immediate shift of the electorate in favor of granting concessions.  
Another coefficient of interest is the one that measures the local electoral impact of 
terror attacks committed in other localities. The sign of this coefficient is a priori 
undetermined. If   is positive it might be because the policies proposed by parties in the 
right bloc won it new supporters after terror attacks. If this coefficient is negative we 
                                                 
4 As noted by Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2002), failing to account for serial correlation 
when computing standard errors may lead to over-rejection of the null hypothesis. We allow for 
correlated errors within localities over time by clustering all the regressions at the locality level. 
5 The information and salience effect of American soldiers killed in action was shown to affect 
local perceptions of the Vietnam war (Gartner, Segura and Wilkening 1997) and the Iraq war 
(Karol and Miguel 2007). 
  6might conclude that national casualties from terrorism and voter disapproval of the 
chosen policy proposed by the right bloc led to an erosion of its support. 
The model above is flexible enough to allow us to address other interesting 
questions regarding the electoral effect of terrorism. In particular, we examine the effects 
of terrorism on the mobilization of the electorate, how the impact of terror fatalities 
varies according to the ideology of the political party holding office, and whether or not 
terrorism polarizes the electorate. 
 
DATA 
To implement our empirical framework we combined the necessary data on electoral 
outcomes and terror fatalities with data on demographic, economic and geographic 
indicators that are available at the locality level in Israel.  
 
Data on Electoral Outcomes 
Our main variable of interest is the vote share for the different political parties 
during the last five national parliamentary elections in Israel. The available electoral data, 
provided by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), include the total number of eligible 
voters, voter turnout, and the support for each political party in the parliamentary 
elections of 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999 and 2003. All this information is available at the 
level of the polling station, thus providing us with a very detailed ecological data set. 
We follow the division of the country defined by the CBS to aggregate the electoral 
data according to the municipal status of each geographical area. For the most part, each 
geographical area is defined by the presence of a single major city that holds 
administrative sway over the space of this area. These are classified as either 
municipalities or local councils. In other cases, several smaller villages are grouped 
together according to their location into a contiguous area called a regional council. Our 
unit of interest consists of municipalities, local councils, and regional councils. The areas 
spanned by these three disjoint geographical units completely cover the Israeli territory, 
including localities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
The number of observations changes over time together with changes in the number 
of municipalities, local councils and regional councils. There were 953 disjoint 
geographical areas in 1988. Sixty-four of them were defined as municipalities, 106 were 
defined as local councils and the rest were grouped into 54 regional councils—this gives 
us 224 observations for the 1988's elections. In 2003 there were 1160 geographical areas 
  7divided into 70 municipalities, 117 local councils and 55 regional councils—that is, 242 
localities.  
To measure the political preferences of each locality's electorate we divide the 
political parties with representatives in the parliament into right-left bloc vote following 
closely the division set forth by Shamir and Arian (1999). Accordingly, the left bloc 
includes all the Arab parties, Meretz, Labor and Am Echad. The right bloc includes 
Likud, all the religious parties, all the nationalist parties (Tzomet, Moledet, National 
Union), and parties identified with Russians immigrants. All the centrists parties (the 
Center Party, the Third Way and Shinui) were not included in any of the blocs. 
We choose to divide the Parliament into right and left blocs to neutralize the effects 
that the different electoral systems in place may have had on the voters' strategies. 
Contrary to the other elections, the parliamentary elections of 1996 and 1999 allowed for 
split-ticket voting, whereby each voter cast a ballot in support of a political party for the 
parliamentary elections and a different ballot for the elections for Prime Minister. This 
different system may have had an effect on the relative support obtained by the different 
parties. Consequently, the results of these elections may not be directly comparable at the 
party level to the results of the parliamentary elections of 1988, 1992 and 2003. These 
concerns are no longer relevant when we divide the parliament into two main blocs. The 
correlation between the relative support for the right bloc out of the two blocs and the 
relative support for the Likud candidate for prime minister out of the two candidates is 
over 99 percent for the elections of 1996 and almost 96 percent for the elections of 
1999.
                                                
6 
Table 1 displays the distribution of seats of the Israeli parliament as well as the 
identity and political affiliation of the prime minister before and after the elections. The 
table depicts the close parity between the two blocs during the period at issue, to the 
point that the political affiliation of the prime minister seems to sway from right bloc to 
left bloc and back whenever this office is up for grabs. This parity is magnified by the 
fact that the ultra orthodox Jewish parties and the parties identified with Russians 
 
6 All the regressions below include a dummy variable to account for any effects that split-ticket 
elections may have had on the voters' preferences. In addition to our focus on right and left blocs, 
the inclusion of the dummy variable helps us further neutralize the effects of the different voting 
systems. Moreover, adding the relative support for the Likud candidate for prime minister instead 
of the relative support for the right bloc of parties when this variable is available does not 
qualitatively affect any of the results. 
  8immigrants were not only active members of every right wing government during the 
studied time period, but they were members of the leftist governments of Yitzhak Rabin 
and Ehud Barak as well. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
li Defense Forces and the archives of two newspapers 
(Ma'a
set that exists on fatal terror attacks against noncombatants on Israeli 
soil s
l variability across localities to conduct a meaningful econometric 
estimation. 
[Figure 1 and Table 2 about here] 
                                                
Data on Terror Fatalities 
We measure the level of terrorism using data on the number of noncombatant Israeli 
fatalities from terror attacks assembled in 2004 by Berrebi (2007) and updated by Berrebi 
and Klor (2008). This data set contains daily information on each and every terror attack 
that caused the death of at least one Israeli noncombatant that occurred on Israeli soil 
between July 13, 1984, the day of the elections for the 11
th Israeli parliament, and June 
30, 2004. The main sources of the data are the Israeli Foreign Ministry, the National 
Insurance Institute, the Israe
riv and Ha'aretz). 
We assign each attack in the database to one of the localities, according to the 
geographic location of the attack, using Geographic Information System (GIS).
7 To the 
best of our knowledge, the combination of the political data set with the data set used by 
Berrebi and Lakdawalla (2007) comprises the most accurate and comprehensive 
unclassified data 
ince 1984.
8 
The geographical distribution of terror fatalities during the time period of interest 
appears in Figure 1 and Table 2. The figure also provides the partition of Israel into 
localities in effect in 2004. The figure and the table show that several localities suffered a 
high number of terror fatalities during the period at issue. Although there is an evident 
higher concentration of fatalities in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv-Yafo, there is still enough 
geographica
 
We calculate for each locality its mean relative support for the right bloc of parties 
over the five parliamentary elections at issue. This statistic provides a glimpse of the 
 
7 Berrebi and Lakdawalla (2007) provide a detailed explanation of this matching. 
8 Our data set on terrorist attacks dates back to 1949. We start our empirical analysis after the 
elections of 1984 because the electoral data is available only for the elections of 1988 onwards. 
  9preferences of the localities' electorate. Figure 2 depicts the distribution of the localities' 
mean relative support for the right bloc. An interesting pattern that emerges from this 
figure is the extant heterogeneity of the localities' preferences. Besides an apparent 
bunching of localities with a low relative support for the right bloc, the rest of the range 
shows a distribution close to uniform, with localities spanning the entire range.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
at suffered at least one terror fatality between two 
consecutive elections and the rest. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 do not observe a clear difference in the average turnout rate of the 
two s
rrorism by several 
Pales
 
 
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the variables described above. The table 
distinguishes between localities th
 
This table exhibits some extent of a patterned difference in terms of the support for 
the right bloc of parties between localities that were attacked and the rest. Namely, 
localities that suffered at least one terror fatality before the elections show a larger 
support for the right bloc than the rest of the localities. The difference in the mean share 
of the vote for the right bloc varies from almost four percentage points in the elections of 
1988 (before terrorism became a major issue dimension for Israeli voters) to over 26 
percentage points in the elections of 1999. These patterns of support do not change 
qualitatively when we restrict our attention to localities that were not occupied by Israel 
in 1967. Notably, we
et of localities. 
Regarding the frequency of terror fatalities, the table illustrates the great variation 
observed on the level of terrorism over time. Although terrorism is not a new 
phenomenon in Israel, the number of terror fatalities was relatively low before the 
elections of 1988. There is an important increase in the frequency of terror fatalities up to 
the elections of 1996, and a step decrease afterwards until the eruption of the second 
Palestinian uprising in September 2000. The significant increase in the number of terror 
fatalities before the elections of 2003 reflects the widespread use of te
tinian factions during the first three years of the second uprising. 
The marked fluctuations on the number of terror fatalities for the entire period 
between every two consecutive elections pale, percentage wise, compared to the 
fluctuations on the number of terror fatalities during shorter periods preceding the 
elections. For example, a comparison for the elections of 1996 to the elections of 1992 
  10reveals that the number of fatalities in the year leading to the elections increased by 
almost 450 percent whereas the number of fatalities for the entire period increased by 
less than 250 percent. The same pattern obtains for the rest of the elections. It is worth 
noting that, comparing the elections of 1999 and 2003, the number of fatalities for the 
entire period increased tenfold whereas the number of fatalities during the year that 
precede
e 
Sixteen
ication purposes to add to the analysis the spatial variation of these two 
variables. 
orate into the analysis additional 
politi
                                                
d the elections increased by over 40 times. 
An analysis of the severity of the terror campaign before the elections has to take 
into account some particularities of the Israeli electoral system. The Israeli system is 
based on a parliamentary democracy with elections that are supposed to take place every 
four years. The parliament, however, may decide by an ordinary majority to dissolve 
itself and call for unscheduled early elections.
9 This means that the timing of elections is 
endogenous to the political environment. In fact, except for the elections of 1988, all 
other Knesset elections during the period at issue preceded their original scheduled dates. 
In 1992, 1996, and 1999 the parliament called for early elections. The elections for th
th Knesset in 2003 were brought forward at the initiative of the prime minister. 
Since the timing of the elections in Israel is not entirely predetermined, the terror 
campaign may not be geared to affect the political preferences of the electorate but a 
consequence thereof. Simply put, terrorists may use terror attacks to topple a government 
that seems unstable and they dislike or, alternatively, they may refrain from attacks to 
help a government of their liking to remain in power. As a consequence, we cannot 
conclude that there is a causal relation between terrorism and political preferences solely 
on the basis of the extant correlation between these two variables over time. It is crucial 
for identif
 
Other Variables of Interest 
To estimate the model as specified above we incorp
cal, socio-economic and demographic variables. 
 
9 During the parliamentary elections of 1996 and 1999 the electoral system included direct 
elections for the premiership. When this system was in place (until the elections of 2003) the 
prime minister, as well as the parliament, could apprise the president of early elections. Now that 
this system has been abolished, the prime minister may recommend to the president that he/she 
call for early elections but the parliament may block any such initiative. 
  11The analysis includes each locality's size, its distance to the closest terrorist home 
base (see Figure 1 for the location of home bases during the period at issue), and dummy 
variables for localities that serve as regional capitals and localities that have an 
international border. These variables, fixed over time, were obtained from Berrebi and 
Lackdawalla (2007) and were all measured in 2004.
10 We also use as covariates the 
locality's population, percentage of Jewish population, percentage of immigrants from the 
former Soviet Union, and the population's ethnic background as measured by the 
percentage of individuals born (or whose father was born, for individuals born in Israel) 
in Asia or Africa. All these variables are reported by the CBS in the Census of 
Population and Housing of 1995. Additionally, we collected from the CBS data on the 
yearly average wage and net migration for each locality. These variables are only 
available for the years 1995 onwards. For the purposes of this study we focus on these 
variables during the year prior to the elections; that is, 1995, 1998 and 2002. We 
normalize the average wage using the consumer price index with 2002 as the base year.
11 
Net migration is defined as the total number of citizens that moved into a locality 
(including new immigrants) minus the total number of citizens that left the locality in a 
given year. We normalize this variable by the locality's total population. Summary 
statistics describing these variables ap
population (also reflected on the higher percentages of families with Asian/African 
                                                
pear in Ta le 4.  b
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 4 presents an intuitive picture concerning the correlation between terror 
fatalities and the control variables of interest. As expected, we observe that on average 
terror attacks occur in localities that are closer to the terror factions' home bases, more 
established localities (in the sense that they function as regional capitals, are more 
populated and absorb more immigrants), localities with a higher percentage of Jewish 
 
10 Berrebi and Lakdawalla (2007) determine the location of a home base of a terror faction at a 
given time based on several sources. Basically, a location is considered to be a home base for a 
terror faction at a specific time if one of their sources (either a news outlet or an institute 
specializing in the study of terrorism) determined after an attack that this location was used for 
bomb-making, training, and/or preparations. 
11 The average wage at the locality level is not available for all the localities during the time 
period of interest. The available data set has 35 missing values for 1996, 13 missing values for 
1999 and 9 missing values for 2003. 
  12background), and wealthier localities. There seems to be no clear correlation between 
having an international border and terror fatalities. Additionally, citizens do not 
overwhelmingly move away from localities that tend to suffer from terrorism. 
F TERROR FATALITIES ON THE PREFERENCES OF THE 
to decide the elections in favor of the right bloc of political parties in 
n average locality. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
ore, that the consequences of terrorism are 
mostly felt and manifested at the local level. 
 
THE EFFECT O
ELECTORATE
Benchmark Specification
Table 5 displays the estimation of the effects of terror fatalities on the preferences of the 
electorate as specified in model (1). Column 1 reports the results of a specification using 
the whole sample and including no covariates except for localities fixed effects. We find 
that the occurrence of a terror fatality within three months of the elections is associated 
with a 0.45 percentage points increase in the locality's relative electoral support for the 
right bloc of political parties. This effect is not only highly statistically significant but is 
also of a significant political magnitude. A terror attack causes, on average, almost three 
fatalities during the time period at issue. Thus, one terror attack causes roughly an 
increase of 1.35 percentage points in the relative support for the right bloc. Given that the 
localities' average relative support for the right bloc on the elections during the time 
period at issue is in the order of 47 percent, an increase by three on the average number 
of attacks is enough 
a
A terror fatality has important electorate effects beyond the locality where it is 
perpetrated. Column 2 examines the full effect of a terror fatality, both in the locality 
where the attack was perpetrated and its repercussions in the other localities. Once we 
control for the effect of the fatality on other localities the local effect is in the order of 
0.23 percentage points. On top of that effect, a terror fatality within three months of the 
elections causes a 0.06 percentage points increase in the relative support for the right bloc 
in each of the rest of the localities. Although we may expect a stronger local effect of 
terrorism in a big country like the U.S., the magnitude of the impact of an attack shows 
an important difference between the targeted locality and the rest of the localities even in 
a small country like Israel. It appears, theref
  13One concern is that there may be characteristics of a locality that vary across time 
and space that are correlated with the occurrence of a terror attack and the support for the 
right bloc.
12 For example, it could be that the distance of a locality to the home base of a 
terrorist faction, the importance of the locality, or the locality's ethnic characteristics may 
determine the political preferences of its inhabitants and the likelihood of a terrorist 
attack. Therefore, in Columns 3 and 4 we directly control for a number of observed 
characteristics of the localities.
13 
Column 3 presents our preferred specification of the regression model. The 
inclusion of the localities' characteristics significantly improves the goodness of fit of the 
model relative to the models of Columns 1 and 2. Moreover, unlike the specification in 
Column 4, the specification in Column 3 retains the rich spatial and temporal variability 
of the previous columns. The specification in Column 4, in contrast, ignores much of the 
existing information because the necessary data for the added covariates is unavailable 
for the elections of 1988 and 1992. Given that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
additional covariates included in Column 4 are jointly or separately different from zero, 
we believe that specification of Column 3 is more accurate.
14  
The estimation in Column 3 shows that the magnitude of the effect of a terror 
fatality does not decrease when the localities' characteristics are taken into account. 
Regarding the added covariates, we observe that the electoral support for the right bloc 
decreases with the distance of the locality to the home base of a terror faction, in 
localities with an international border and with the locality's population. On the contrary, 
the support for the right bloc increases in regional capitals, population density, the 
locality's percentage of Jews, the percentage of individuals with an Asian/African 
background, and percentage of immigrants from the former Soviet Union.  
                                                 
12 The next section provides evidence consistent with the notion that terror attacks are driven by 
fixed characteristics and not by the observed time-varying variables. This suggests that terror 
attacks are also less likely to be correlated with time-varying locality-specific unobserved shocks. 
13 These estimations include covariates that are constant over time and, consequently, are 
perfectly correlated with the localities fixed effects. Therefore, we do not include fixed effects 
whenever the estimated model contains covariates that are time invariant. 
14 It is not possible to directly compare the fits of the models in Columns 3 and 4 since they are 
based on different data samples and adjusted R squares are not well defined for the estimation of 
panel models with random effects. 
  14In addition to all the covariates used in Column 3, the specification in Column 4 
includes each locality's standard deviation from the national average wage (measured 
separately for every year considered in the analysis) and each locality's net migration 
share of its total population.
15 Since these two variables are available at the locality level 
only from 1995 onwards, we restrict our estimation to the elections of 1996, 1999 and 
2003 when they are included as covariates. The inclusion of the average wage at the 
locality level helps us control for possible effects of economic conditions on the relative 
support for the right-wing party, as predicted by the economic voter hypothesis. [See 
Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) for a thorough review of this literature.] The inclusion 
of the net migration share of the population is meant to control for Tiebout's (1956) 
hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, voters sort themselves out between the 
different localities according to their preferences. That is, our results could be a 
consequence of left-wing voters migrating from localities that tend to suffer from 
terrorism to localities that tend not to be stricken by terror attacks, without any voter 
actually changing her preferences. Adding the net migration share of each locality's 
population as a covariate allows us to differentiate migration of left-wing voters to 
localities that do not suffer terror attacks from the hypothesis stating that voters change 
their preferences. 
The results show that the average wage's standard deviation does not have a 
statistically significant impact on the electorate's preferences. This result supports the 
prevailing view that the security-peace dimension is by far the most influential dimension 
for Israeli voters (Shamir and Arian 1999; Sheafer 2004). Similarly to average wage, net 
migration does not significantly affect the preferences of the electorate or the electoral 
impact of terror fatalities. This establishes that the local electoral effect of terror fatalities 
is not driven by voters changing their locality of residence. Rather, it is caused by voters 
changing their preferences. Regarding the estimates of the effect of terrorism, this 
specification yields coefficients of lower magnitude for the effects of local and total 
terror fatalities. Whereas the estimate for local terror fatalities remains highly statistically 
significant, the estimate for total terror fatalities is only marginally significant (at the 
                                                 
15 Formally, the standard deviation from the national average wage for a locality i whose average 
wage rate at time t is wit  is defined as (wit - wt)/ t, where wt is the national average wage and  t is 
its standard deviation, both measured at time t. This specification of the wage rate delivers a 
coefficient that is unit free without affecting its significance level.  
  1511.2% level) because this specification ignores much of the available temporal variability 
existent in the data. 
Columns 5 to 8 in the table repeat the same empirical exercise excluding from the 
data sample the set of localities in territories that Israel occupied following the war in 
1967. This is an important robustness test since the territories occupied in 1967 are 
characterized by higher levels of terror fatalities and an electorate that shows a higher 
support for the right bloc.
16 Therefore, their inclusion may lead us to observe a 
confounding correlation between the two variables of interest. 
Columns 5 to 8 make it evident that restricting the sample does not qualitatively 
affect the results. Although we observe a slight decrease in the political effects of terror 
fatalities, both locally and nationally, this decrease is not of a significant magnitude. That 
is, the positive effect of terror fatalities on the relative support for the right bloc of parties 
is maintained in this restricted sample of localities. 
Contrary to the effects of terror fatalities, the effect of several covariates is 
significantly affected by the exclusion of localities occupied in 1967. Most notably, the 
effect of the distance to the terrorist factions' home bases changes from significantly 
negative to positive in the restricted sample. Naturally, localities in territories occupied in 
1967 are closer to terrorists' home bases (which are located either in limiting countries or 
in these territories). In these particular localities we observe a relatively higher support 
for the right bloc of parties, and thus the negative correlation between these two 
variables. The fact that this correlation becomes positive in the restricted sample shows 
that the connection between the relative support for the right bloc of parties and the 
distance to home bases is not causal in nature.
17 
Does Terrorism have a Mobilization Effect on the Electorate? 
                                                 
16 During the studied time period, localities in territories occupied in 1967 suffered, on average, 
over 1.5 fatalities between two consecutive elections. These localities showed, on average, a 
relative support for the right bloc equal to 0.84. The average number of fatalities between two 
consecutive elections for the rest of the localities is 0.69. These localities' average relative 
support for the right bloc is 0.43. 
17 The effect of the percentage of Jewish population also changes sign in the restricted sample. 
This is due to its high correlation with the percentage of individuals with family origin from Asia 
or Africa once we remove localities occupied in 1967. 
  16The regression analyses presented in Table 5 suggest that terror fatalities have a 
significant effect on the preferences of the electorate. The same evidence, however, lends 
itself to an alternative interpretation whereby terror fatalities selectively affect the turnout 
of part of the electorate without changing its preferences. For example, the effect 
documented in Table 5 is consistent with an increase in the local turnout rate of right-
wing voters or a decrease of the local turnout rate of left-wing voters (or both) in the 
aftermath of terror attacks. 
Table 6 analyses the possibility that terror fatalities affect the localities' turnout rate. 
This table presents the effects of the same explanatory variables used in Table 5 on the 
localities' turnout rate. The results show that local terror fatalities do not affect the 
turnout rate of the locality's electorate. Our preferred specifications in Columns 3 and 7 
suggest that total terror fatalities may even demobilize the electorate.  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
The analyses in Table 6 do not rule out the possibility that terror fatalities 
simultaneously mobilize right-wing voters and demobilize left-wing voters without 
affecting turnout. Table 7 addresses this possibility by studying the impact of terror 
fatalities on the relative support for the right bloc of parties in localities with high 
average levels of turnout. Simply put, in localities with average turnout rates of above 85 
percent almost everybody votes. Therefore, any influence of terrorism on the relative 
support for the right bloc must be a consequence of voters changing their preferences and 
not their turnout decisions.
18 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
The evidence presented in Table 7 strongly supports the hypothesis that terror 
fatalities affect the electorate's preferences. The coefficients on local terror fatalities and 
total terror fatalities in localities with high levels of turnout are not only highly 
statistically significant. They also increase in magnitude as we focus on localities with 
particularly high levels of turnout. Given that Arab citizens have lower levels of turnout 
than Jewish citizens in parliamentary elections (see, e.g., Al-Haj 1995; Ghanem and 
                                                 
18 Table 7 and Table 9 below do not report the coefficients for the other covariates to simplify the 
exposition. These estimates are very similar to the ones reported in Table 5. The complete results 
are available from the authors upon request.  
  17Ozacky-Lazar 2002; Ben Bassat and Dahan 2007), restricting the sample to localities 
with high levels of turnout implicitly excludes from the analysis localities with a high 
percent of Arab population. Arab localities are less likely to increase their support for the 
right bloc of parties in the aftermath of a terror attack, thus excluding them from the 
sample causes an increase on the magnitude of the coefficient. 
 
An Analysis of Policy versus Partisan Voting 
Our econometric estimation, so far, implicitly assumed that the political effect of a terror 
fatality is the same for all the prime ministers holding office during the period at issue. 
This view is in accordance with the policy voting hypothesis. Accordingly, parties 
benefit from the salience of issues to which they are generally viewed as attaching 
highest priority (Kiewiet 1981). This hypothesis implies that the Israeli electorate 
increases its support for the right bloc of political parties after a terror attack because this 
bloc is identified with a higher emphasis on terrorism deterrence. In other words, since 
the right bloc has a policy that places more weight on security related issues, terror 
attacks during the tenure of a prime minister from the right bloc may be perceived as 
inevitable, whereas terror attacks during the tenure of a prime minister from the left bloc 
may be perceived as preventable by using stronger deterrence policies. 
In contrast, the partisan theory of voting predicts the opposite effect. Accordingly, 
parties are evaluated most heavily in terms of their performance on the issues to which 
they attach a high priority (Powell and Whitten 1993). Therefore, repeated terror attacks 
may cause a decrease in the support for the right bloc under a rightist incumbent, and 
may not have a significant effect on the electorate's preferences under a leftist incumbent. 
The partisan theory of voting provides therefore a refinement of the retrospective theory 
of voting proposed by Fiorina (1981). Whether voters are purely retrospective or use 
their perceived performance of the incumbent government to estimate its future 
performance, the partisan theory of voting posits that voters are especially prone to hold 
an incumbent government from the right bloc to a higher standard in policy areas related 
to terrorism because this bloc is perceived to place greater ideological emphasis on the 
security dimension.   
Table 8 tests the alternative approaches by looking at the interaction between local 
terror fatalities and the party affiliation of the incumbent prime minister.
19 
                                                 
19 In principle, we would like to add to the estimations of Table 8 the interaction between total 
terror fatalities and the party affiliation of the incumbent primer minister as well. Unfortunately, 
  18 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
As shown in the table for the full and restricted samples, respectively, the electoral 
effect of a terror fatality is not affected by the identity of the party holding office. There 
is strong evidence of a significant incumbency effect, as the relative support for the right 
bloc increases by 2.67 percentage points in the full sample and by 3.26 percentage points 
in the restricted sample when the incumbent prime minister belongs to this bloc.
20 The 
coefficient on the interaction between local fatalities and a rightist incumbent prime 
minister, however, is not statistically significant. In other words, the electoral impact of 
local terror fatalities does not depend on whether or not the prime minister at the time of 
the attacks belongs to the right bloc. Hence, the empirical evidence supports the policy 
voting hypothesis, whereby terrorism causes an increase in the support for the right bloc 
regardless of the political affiliation of the incumbent prime minister. Although we are 
not able to systematically assess the validity of this claim for localities that do not suffer 
from terror fatalities, the evidence according to local terror fatalities is consistent with the 
results of Berrebi and Klor (2006) based on the time series variation of public opinion 
polls at the national level. 
 
Does Terrorism Polarize the Electorate? 
This subsection focuses on sub-samples of localities, grouped according to their political 
preferences, to analyze the extent to which left and right leaning localities exhibit a 
similar reaction to terrorism. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is not a clear theoretical prediction regarding 
the effects of terrorism on the ideological polarization of the electorate. It is nevertheless 
important to empirically explore this issue given the vast ramifications that polarization 
                                                                                                                                                 
since total terror fatalities and the party affiliation of the incumbent prime minister vary 
exclusively over time, the available data consisting only of five national elections does not 
provide us with enough temporal variability to estimate this additional coefficient. As a 
consequence, the interaction between the party affiliation of the incumbent primer minister and 
total terror fatalities cannot be estimated due to its collinearity with the party affiliation of the 
incumbent primer minister. 
20 This is consistent with Goldberg's (2004) analysis, which mentions the favorable incumbency 
effect for the right bloc as one of the reasons for the electoral collapse of the left bloc of parties in 
the elections of 2003.  
  19has on a country's political system. As argued in Sartori's (1976) seminal work, 
polarization causes centrifugal pressure that shifts away the support for centrist parties 
and inhibits the formation of stable parliamentary majorities. This directly leads to 
fragmentation and destabilization of democratic regimes. Additionally, the polarization 
of the population is likely to cause social conflict as well as marked fluctuations of public 
policies, thus undermining the country's political and economic performance. 
Consequently, if indeed terrorism causes the polarization of the population, it follows 
that terrorism does not simply bring an overall increase in the support for the right bloc 
but, in fact, has additional important structural political, social and economic effects. 
To test whether terrorism polarizes the electorate we take advantage of the 
heterogeneity of the localities' preferences shown in Figure 2, and estimate the regression 
model that appears in Column 3 of Table 5 for sub-samples of the localities. These sub-
samples are determined according to the localities' mean relative support for the right 
bloc over the elections during the time period at issue. The results of the estimations 
appear in Table 9. 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
To analyze the results of Table 9 let us focus first on left leaning localities. 
Interestingly, local terror fatalities do not move left-leaning localities further to the left. 
Rather, the effect of local terror fatalities on the relative support for the right bloc 
gradually increases the more left-leaning the localities are. Whereas the local effect of 
terror fatalities in localities with a mean support for the right bloc below 0.5 is almost 
double the one observed for all the localities, this effect increases more than tenfold in 
localities with a mean support for the right bloc of parties below 0.2. The positive effect 
of terrorism is thus in accordance with the hypothesis delineated in Section 2. Simply 
put, terror attacks significantly affect the well-being of the residents of these localities, 
increase the salience of the conflict, and predispose voters to support parties identified 
with a higher emphasis on a strong deterrence policy. 
Contrary to local terror fatalities, total terror fatalities (i.e. attacks outside the 
voters’ localities) cause a significant decrease in the support for the right bloc of parties 
in left leaning localities. That is, terror fatalities elsewhere appear to reinforce pre-
existing views of the electorate, leading residents of left leaning localities to emphasize 
non violent solutions to the conflict (e.g. territorial concessions) instead of an increase in 
security and deterrence.    
  20The overall effect of terrorism in left leaning localities is not straightforward 
because total and local terror fatalities have opposite effects on the electorate’s 
preferences. Among these localities, only those that suffer a high number of local terror 
fatalities vis-à-vis total terror fatalities increase their support for the right bloc of parties, 
while all the rest of the localities decrease their support for that bloc.  To be precise, for a 
left leaning locality to increase its support for the right bloc of parties its ratio of total to 
local fatalities has to be lower than the ratio of the coefficient on local to total fatalities. 
Based on the estimated coefficients, to increase its support for the right bloc the ratio of 
total to local fatalities has to be below 10.75 (that is, 0.0043 divided by 0.0004) for a 
locality whose mean right-bloc vote share is between 0.4 and 0.5. The cutoff ratio for 
localities whose mean right-bloc vote share is below 0.4 is approximately 25. 
According to the actual distribution of local and total terror fatalities, the ratio of 
total to local fatalities is below the threshold for only three left-leaning localities.
21 These 
localities (Tel Aviv – Yafo, Qiryat Tivon and Menasheh) are thus the only left-leaning 
localities that increase their support for the right-bloc of parties in an election during the 
time period at issue. Weighting the localities according to their population, this implies 
that only a quarter of the left-leaning population resides in localities that increase their 
support for the right-bloc. The rest of this population resides in localities that increase 
their support for the left-bloc of parties.  
The analysis for right-leaning localities is simpler. Whereas local terror fatalities do 
not significantly affect the preferences of the electorate on these localities, total terror 
fatalities cause a significant increase in the support for the right bloc of parties. 
Therefore, terrorism has an unambiguous impact on the preference of these localities’ 
electorate.  
Summarizing, the empirical evidence shows that terrorism increases the support for 
the right-bloc among all the localities whose population leans toward the right, and it 
decreases the support for the right bloc among the vast majority of localities whose 
population leans toward the left-bloc. Hence, we conclude that terrorism causes the 
                                                 
21 The low number of left-leaning localities that increase their support for the right bloc is a direct 
consequence of the estimated coefficients, as left-leaning localities and right-leaning localities 
experience comparable levels of terrorism. In fact, the next section shows that, even if the 
political preferences of the Israeli electorate may affect terror organizations’ decisions to 
perpetrate an attack, the localities’ political preferences do not affect the location of the attacks.  
  21ideological polarization of the electorate. We obtain the same qualitative conclusions 
when we exclude from our sample localities in territories occupied in 1967. 
 
Robustness Tests 
This subsection presents several robustness tests performed to the main results presented 
in Table 5. These tests show that the effect of terrorism on the voters' preferences 
documented in Table 5 is robust to alternative specifications of the main variables used in 
the analysis, as well as to excluding outlier observations from the data sample.
22 
Table 10 repeats the estimations of Table 5 for alternative proxies used to measure 
the severity of terrorism. The first panel of the table simply uses terror attacks instead of 
terror fatalities as a proxy for the level terrorism. The second panel measures terrorism 
through a dummy variable that equals one in localities that suffered a terror attack within 
3 months of the elections (regardless of the number of attacks) and zero otherwise. 
Although the measure used in Table 5 is more precise than the ones proposed in Table 
10, when we combine it with our empirical specification it carries the implicit 
assumption that the effect of terrorism is linear on the number of fatalities. This implicit 
assumption is not present in the alternative specifications of Table 10, especially the one 
in the second panel of the table. 
[Table 10 about here] 
 
The table shows that the impact of terrorism on the preferences of the electorate is 
robust to the alternative measuring methods. The magnitude of the coefficients is higher 
compared to the ones estimated in Table 5, even after taking into account that an attack 
causes on average almost 3 fatalities. This implies that the marginal effect of a terror 
fatality on the preferences of the electorate is decreasing. This hypothesis receives 
additional support from a comparison of the two panels of Table 10. The coefficients 
estimated for the local effect of terrorism when using an indicator for the severity of 
terrorism are at least 1.35 times greater than the respective coefficients estimated using 
terror attacks, even though localities that suffered at least one terror attack suffered on 
average 1.2 attacks. 
                                                 
22 All the estimations in the previous subsections were also performed for the alternative 
specifications used in these robustness tests. The results are very similar to the ones reported in 
the text. They are, of course, available from the authors upon request. 
  22We present the results of the two specifications above because the magnitude of 
their coefficients is directly comparable to the coefficients estimated in Table 5. The 
positive effect of local terror attacks on the support for the right bloc of parties is robust 
to other sensible specifications. For example, when we normalize local fatalities by the 
size of the localities’ populations the estimated local effect is positive and highly 
statistically significant as well (the actual coefficient is 0.00074 with t-statistic equal to 
2.15). We also estimated the same specification of Table 5 but excluding from the sample 
Jerusalem and Tel Aviv–Yafo. We performed this test because, as shown in Table 2, 
these two cities are clear outliers with respect to the number of terror fatalities they 
suffered. The estimation revealed that, for our preferred specification, the effect of local 
fatalities increases to 0.0064 and remains highly statistically significant. Notably, the 
increase in the magnitude of the coefficient after removing from the sample the two most 
stricken cities provides additional evidence of a decreasing marginal effect of terror 
fatalities on the preferences of the electorate.
23  
Table 11 studies the effects of terrorism on three different definitions of the relative 
support for the right bloc of parties. These definitions alternatively exclude the parties 
that represent Russians immigrants and ultra orthodox Jews from the right bloc of parties, 
and the Arab parties from the left bloc of parties. We test the exclusion of Russian and 
ultra orthodox parties from the right bloc because these parties at times joined coalitional 
governments lead by the Labor party. We exclude in the last two columns the Arab 
parties from the left bloc because, arguably, terrorism affects the support for Arab parties 
differently than it affects the support for the rest of the parties. 
 
[Table 11 about here] 
 
The table shows that the results are robust to these alternative definitions. In fact, 
we observe an important increase in the local effect of terror fatalities when we exclude 
the ultra-orthodox parties from the analysis (though the significance level decreases from 
1% to 10% in the restricted sample). To understand this increase, note that supporters of 
                                                 
23 A widely used alternative specification that allows for a nonlinear effect of fatalities on public 
opinion is that of logging cumulative fatalities (following the approach initiated by Mueller 
1973), or a combination of logging cumulative fatalities and marginal fatalities (Gartner and 
Segura 1998). The significant number of localities in our sample that did not suffer from terror 
attacks prevents us from adopting a specification along those lines. 
  23the ultra orthodox parties are extremely unlikely to vote for a different party. Hence, 
excluding these voters from the analysis simply increases the sensitivity of the effect of 
terrorism, as we focus now only on voters that are more likely to shift alliances between 
the two blocs.
24 
Our last robustness test uses different time spans to measure terror fatalities. The 
estimations so far took into account only terror fatalities within three months of the 
elections. This choice seems arbitrary and leaves out of the analysis important 
information. Table 12 extends the analysis to alternative time spans. That is, the different 
estimations presented on this table study the effect of the timing of terror fatalities on the 
preferences of the electorate. The first column shows the effects of terror fatalities that 
occurred within three months of the elections and every subsequent column includes into 
the analysis terror fatalities that occurred farther away from the elections.
25 
 
[Table 12 about here] 
 
The results of this exercise are conclusive: the electoral impact of terror fatalities 
does not qualitatively change for the different time spans used to measure terror fatalities. 
Quantitatively, there is a decrease in the electoral impact of terrorism the farther away the 
fatality occurs from the elections. The gradual decrease of the effect occurs both at the 
local and national level. At the local level, we observe that a terror fatality more than a 
year before the elections looses over half of its electoral impact on the electorate's 
preferences. Interestingly, the decrease is more pronounced at the national level where 
the terror attack is not as salient for the voters. For example, a terror fatality over a year 
before the elections looses over 85 percent of its impact on an average locality that was 
not the direct target of the attack. Similar conclusions are reached in Columns 5 to 8 with 
a restricted sample that excludes localities occupied in 1967. 
These results are consistent with several theoretical models that posit that not only 
terror fatalities convey messages that may affect the preferences of the electorate, but 
also the lack of terror attacks should, in principle, have an effect on the voters' beliefs and 
                                                 
24 Although Arab voters are also unlikely to vote for a non-Arab party, they do change their 
turnout rates significantly across elections (Rouhana, Saleh and Sultany 2005). This may explain 
why the coefficients do not change much when we exclude the Arab parties from the sample. 
25 Columns 1 and 5 in the table simply reproduce the evidence presented in Columns 3 and 7 of 
Table 5, respectively, to facilitate the comparison of the coefficients for the different time spans. 
  24preferences (Kydd and Walter 2002; Bueno de Mesquita 2005a; Berrebi and Klor 2006). 
Accordingly, we should expect that terror fatalities have a stronger electoral impact the 
closer to the elections they occur. Unfortunately, we are not able to directly test this 
hypothesis because terror fatalities at the locality level are strongly correlated over time. 
Therefore, it is not possible to separate the individual effects of terror fatalities measured 
over different time spans when included on the same regression model. 
 
TESTING FOR REVERSE CAUSALITY: DO POLITICAL PREFERENCES 
INFLUENCE THE LOCATION OF TERROR ATTACKS? 
A major methodological concern regarding our identification strategy is that terrorists 
may choose the location of their attacks strategically, and that this choice may not be 
orthogonal to the political preferences of the localities' electorate. To dissipate this 
concern we need to establish that, even if the political preferences of the Israeli electorate 
may affect the terror organizations' decision on whether or not to perpetrate an attack, the 
location of the attack is not chosen as a reaction to the political views of any particular 
locality's electorate. This section uses a falsification exercise to provide evidence in 
support of the assumption behind our identification strategy. 
Our analysis adds to Berrebi and Lakdawalla (2007) the political preferences of the 
Israeli electorate at the locality level. Berrebi and Lakdawalla study the determinants of 
terrorism's risk in Israel. They assess the success of different factors in explaining the 
location of terror attacks using data on the location and the timing of terror attacks in 
Israel from 1949 to the present. Their econometric analysis focuses on six covariates, all 
measured in 2004: the locality's population, size, percentage of Jewish population, 
distance to the closest terrorist home base, whether the locality serves as a regional 
capital, and whether it has an international border. They also add a Jerusalem dummy to 
account for the unique position of this city as an attractive and accessible target of 
terrorism. 
This section replicates their econometric estimation using the same data set but 
including the vote share for the right-bloc of parties as an additional covariate. Formally, 
the adopted econometric specification is 
 
(Terror Fatalities)i =  +  (Right Bloc Share)i + Xi + i    (2) 
 
where (Terror Fatalities)i is the number of fatalities in locality i between every two 
successive elections;  (Right Bloc Share)i denotes the share of the two-bloc vote in 
  25support of the right bloc in locality i; and Xi is the vector of covariates used by Berrebi 
and Lakdawalla (2007). Namely, Xi includes locality's i population; its size (in square 
kilometers); the percentage of Jews in the local population; the distance between locality 
i and the closest terrorist home base; and three dummy variables: one for Jerusalem, the 
second one for localities that have an international border, and the last one for localities 
that serve as regional capitals. Note that if   is consistently positive and significant this 
may imply that terror factions especially target localities that support the right bloc of 
parties. This would mean that the electorate's preferences affect the location of terror 
attacks (and not the other way around) invalidating, therefore, our identification 
strategy.
26 
We estimate the equation above for every election during the time period at issue. 
Table 13 displays the results of the estimation.
27 Each column in this table presents the 
estimated coefficients from a separate Poisson regression for each election. For example, 
the column entitled 1988 presents the results of the regression above based on terror 
fatalities between the parliamentary elections on November 1, 1988 and the 
parliamentary elections on June 23, 1992, combined with the electoral results of the 1988 
elections.
28 The respective cells of the table contain the estimated coefficients with their 
corresponding robust t-statistics (in parenthesis) and elasticities calculated around the 
means of the independent variables (in brackets). 
 
[Table 13 about here] 
 
The results show that there is not a significant relationship between a locality's 
terror fatalities after an election and the locality's share of the vote for the right bloc. For 
all the regressions in the top panel of the table the absolute value of the t-statistics are 
well below 2, indicating that essentially we cannot statistically reject the hypothesis that 
there is no correlation between these two variables. These results are consistent with the 
                                                 
26 A similar falsification approach was used by Karol and Miguel (2006) in their study of the 
impact of Iraq war casualties on the political preferences of American voters. 
27 The coefficients for the constant term as well as the vector of covariates used by Berrebi and 
Lakdawalla (2007) are not reported to simplify the exposition.  
28 Note that our data set includes terror fatalities only until June 2004. Hence, the estimation for 
the elections of 2003 is based on terror fatalities up until that date and not until the elections of 
2006. 
  26main logic behind the Israeli electoral system. This system is characterized by nationwide 
proportional representation. That is, every vote has the same electoral power, regardless 
of the voters' location or the preferences of the localities' electorate. Consequently, except 
for the message that terror attacks may potentially send to the electorate, there is not an 
electoral incentive to choose the location of the attacks based on the localities' 
preferences. 
The lower panel of Table 13 presents the results of the same estimation but 
excluding from our data sample localities in territories occupied by Israel in 1967. As 
expected, the results are even more conclusive than the ones observed using the full 
sample. Not only are most of the coefficients for the share of the vote for the right bloc 
statistically insignificant, but additionally a majority of these coefficients are even 
negative. 
The other covariates included in the regressions are consistent with the results of 
Berrebi and Lakdawalla (2007). The main determinants of the location of a terror attack 
are whether the locality serves as a regional capital, the locality's population, and its 
percentage of Jews. 
One final comment is due on the effect of the distance to terror factions' home bases 
on the number of terror fatalities. Whereas this covariate has a significant negative effect 
on the number of terror fatalities for the elections of 1988, 1992 and 1999, its effect for 
the elections of 2003 is not only positive but highly statistically significant.
29 We 
conjecture that the striking change on the effect of this covariate is due partly to the 
construction of the separation fence between several localities under the rule of the 
Palestinian Authority and localities in Israel. In its first phase, the fence was built around 
Palestinian localities housing home bases of terror factions. We believe that as a 
consequence of this additional obstacle terror factions began to send their operatives into 
Israeli localities to commit attacks not directly from their home bases, but from more 
accessible locations. Thus, not only the strong positive connection between a locality's 
closeness to a terror home base and terror fatalities ceased to exists, but it even becomes 
                                                 
29 The robust t-statistics for this covariate using the entire sample are -1.04 (for the elections of 
1988), -2.59 (for 1992), -0.6 (for 1996), -2.11 (for 1999) and 2.15 for the elections of 2003. 
Similar results are obtained using the restricted sample. 
  27negative as the fence shifted terror attacks to localities further away from these home 
bases.
30 
To sum up, the results of this section confirm the crucial assumption of the 
proposed identification strategy. Namely, the political preferences of a locality's 
electorate does not seem to affect the number of terror fatalities suffered by this locality 
once we control for other factors that influence the location of a terror attack. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study provided strong empirical support for the hypothesis that the electorate is 
highly sensitive to terror fatalities. Notably, it presented solid evidence that terrorism 
causes an important increase in the support for the right bloc of political parties. This 
effect is of a significant political magnitude, to the extent that the occurrence of a terror 
attack before an election (or the lack thereof) can clearly determine the electoral 
outcome. Table 14 presents a calibration of the impact of terrorism on the distribution of 
seats of the Israeli parliament. This table simply multiplies the estimated effects of 
terrorism by each locality’s valid ballots and the actual distribution of terror attacks to 
calculate the number of voters that switched alliances between blocs. The table also 
exhibits the official number of valid ballots and votes per mandate. 
 
[Table 14 about here] 
 
The results of this calibration are remarkable. They suggest that terrorism not only 
affected the composition of every Israeli parliament during the time period at issue, but it 
may had very well determined which party obtained a plurality in two of the elections 
analyzed. This appears to be the case for the elections of 1988 (where the Likud defeated 
Labor by one mandate) and the elections of 1996 (where Netanyahu defeated Peres by 
less than 30,000 votes). Moreover, note that an additional terror attack within 3 months 
of the 1992 elections could have shifted the majority of the parliament from the left to the 
right bloc of parties (the actual difference between the two blocs was 61 to 59 parliament 
members in favor of the left bloc).  
                                                 
30 We refer to this effect as the spatial substitution effect of the separation fence. This effect is 
similar to the substitution effect of other antiterrorism policies that cause terror organizations to 
shift between different attacks modes (Enders and Sandler 1993). 
  28At first glance these results seem paradoxical: Terror fatalities cause an increase in 
the support for the bloc of parties that is associated with a more intransigent position 
toward terrorism and territorial concessions. In other words, terrorism supposedly 
undermines the terror faction's goal. Some scholars may interpret this as further evidence 
that terror attacks against civilians does not help terror organizations achieve their stated 
goals (Abrahms 2006). Other scholars place more emphasis on the complex structure of 
terror factions, who tend to have a number of objectives (Kydd and Walter 2006). Under 
some circumstances, these organizations face trade-offs between their main objectives, 
and a chosen strategy in pursuit of some of them may undermine the likelihood of 
achieving others. 
There exist a number of alternative rational explanations behind terror campaigns. 
An interesting approach focuses on the impact of internal political considerations. For 
example, Bloom (2004, 2005) posits that terror attacks are a consequence of the internal 
political competition between Palestinian factions. This approach is consistent with the 
empirical evidence presented by Jaeger and Paserman (2006) showing that terror factions 
indeed react to each other. Furthermore, extremists may perpetrate terror attacks with the 
goal to provoke the Israeli government into a forceful response against the Palestinian 
population. Accordingly, terrorists expect that a forceful Israeli retaliation radicalizes the 
population and increases the overall support for extremist factions (Bueno de Mesquita 
and Dickson 2006; Jaeger and Paserman 2007; Siqueira and Sandler 2006). 
Other approaches focus more closely on the interaction between terrorism and 
political processes. Kydd and Walter (2002) argue that terror attacks are a consequence 
of extremist factions trying to sabotage peace processes. On the other hand, Bueno de 
Mesquita (2005a) claims that terrorism increases after peace agreements because only 
moderates militants accept those agreements, leaving extremists militants in full charge 
of the terror campaign. Finally, Berrebi and Klor (2006) argue that terrorism is intended 
to impose a cost for the occupation on the Israeli voters and induce them to support 
territorial concessions. According to Berrebi and Klor's approach it is possible that, even 
if the electorate's support for the right bloc increases as a consequence of terror attacks, 
the political position of the right bloc (while still more hawkish than that of the left bloc) 
may be affected as well, and become less intransigent over time.  
The theories just presented not only rationalize the behavior of terrorist factions but 
that of the Israeli electorate (or Israeli government) as well. Basically, these theories posit 
that the Israeli electorate does not perfectly know the actual division of power between 
  29the moderate and extremist factions. In this setup, a terror attack provides new 
information to the electorate. That is, terrorism tends to persuade the Israeli electorate 
that the moderate faction is unwilling or unable to stop terrorism and hence cannot be 
trusted. This rationalizes the overall increase in the support for the right bloc after terror 
attacks.
31 
We focused on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the case study of interest for 
several reasons. First, terrorism is one of Israel's most salient issues. Over five hundred 
terror attacks resulted in more than a thousand and two hundred Israeli fatalities since 
July 1984, the date of the elections for the 11
th Israeli Parliament. This provided us with 
enough observations to be able to conduct a rigorous empirical analysis. Furthermore, the 
political positions of the Israeli political parties regarding terrorism and the occupation 
are fairly well known to voters and terrorists alike, allowing us to provide a clear 
interpretation of our results. 
The particularities of the Israeli case notwithstanding, the revealed empirical 
evidence on the consequences of terror fatalities may describe similar patterns elsewhere. 
This case study may teach us general lessons based on over fifty years of dealing with 
terrorism. These lessons show that terror attacks affect the electorate, substantiating the 
hypothesis that democracies are especially susceptible to be targeted by terror 
organizations. Democratic governments should take note of the political implications of 
terrorism that we uncovered when they device counter-terrorism policies. In general, the 
implementation of counter-terrorism policies is accompanied by an increase on the 
salience of terrorism, due partly to public statements made by policy makers. Our results 
imply that an increase in the salience of terrorism as an important issue dimension has a 
negative effect that may encourage terrorists to intensify their campaign. On the contrary, 
policies that diminish the electorate's sensitivity to terrorism may be very efficient in 
lowering its threat as well. 
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  35Figure 2: Distribution of Localities' Mean Relative Support for the Right Bloc
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  361988 1992 1996 1999 2003
Yitzhak Shamir Yitzhak Shamir Shimon Peres Benjamin Netanyahu Ariel Sharon
(Likud) (Likud) (Labor) (Likud) (Likud)
Yitzhak Shamir Yitzhak Rabin Benjamin Netanyahu Ehud Barak Ariel Sharon
(Likud) (Labor) (Likud) (Labor) (Likud)
- Likud 40 32 32 19 38
- Nationalist Parties 12 17 11 13 13
-Ultra Orthodox Parties 13 10 14 22 16
-Russian Parties 00762
- Labor and Am Echad 39 44 34 28 22
- Meretz 8 12 9 10 6
- Arab Parties 659 1 0 8
2 0 4 12 15
79.7 77.4 79.3 78.7 68.9
Table 1
Distribution of Seats in the Israeli Parliament Between Right and Left Blocs
Note: The Israeli Parliament has 120 seats. For the elections of 1988, 1992 and 2003 the party with a plurality in the parliament elected the prime minister. For the elections of 1996 and 1999 the
prime minister was directly elected by the electorate. Source: The official website of the Israeli Parliament (www.knesset.gov.il).
Seats for Parties in the Right Bloc
Seats for Parties in the Left Bloc
Turnout Rate
Prime Minister After the Elections
Seats for Centrist Parties
Prime Minister Before the ElectionsTotal Terror Fatalities
Terror Fatalities within one 
year of the elections
Terror Fatalities within 6 
months of the elections
Terror Fatalities within 3 
months of the elections
Jerusalem 244 142 70 31
Tel Aviv - Yafo 137 59 46 37
Gaza Coast 44 17 14 12
Netanya 42 34 0 0
Samaria 41 25 5 4
Haifa 33 15 0 0
Qiryat Arba 31 16 9 6
Hadera 22 2 2 2
Rishon Leziyyon 21 19 1 0
Kefar Yona 21 0 0 0
Immanu'el 20 9 0 0
Megido 19 17 1 0
Mevasseret Ziyyon 17 1 0 0
Afula 16 2 0 0
Menasheh 16 12 5 5
Mateh Binyamin 15 9 2 0
Pardes Hanna-Karkur 14 14 14 0
Bet Shean 14 6 6 6
Nahariyya 14 2 1 0
Har Hevron 10 9 5 4
Localities with the Highest Number of Terror Fatalities Between 1988 and 2003
Table 21988 1992 1996 1999 2003
211 210 201 228 204
0.4708 0.4533 0.4220 0.4436 0.4774
(0.292) (0.261) (0.32) (0.278) (0.328)
0.8149 0.7895 0.8060 0.7982 0.6941 
(0.09) (0.094) (0.093) (0.096) (0.108)
13 22 34 12 38
0.5088 0.6075 0.6227 0.7047 0.6876
(0.308) (0.183) (0.234) (0.175) (0.271)
0.8165 0.8170 0.8056 0.8273 0.7178 
(0.093) (0.072) (0.065) (0.059) (0.072)
28 91 221 53 543
61 7 7 68 3 4 8
41 1 6 12 1 1 6
Entries in the table represent the means of the relevant variable. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Total Fatalities 6 months before the election
Localities that did not suffer terror fatalities since 
the previous parliamentary elections
Localities that suffered at least one terror fatality 
since the previous parliamentary elections
Total Fatalities since previous election
Total Fatalities one year before the election
Mean Vote Share for Right Bloc
Mean Vote Share for Right Bloc
Turnout Rate
Turnout Rate
Number of Localities
Number of Localities
Table 3
Summary Statistics1988 1992 1996 1999 2003
0.0711 0.0429 0.0199 0.0526 0.0245
(0.258) (0.203) (0.140) (0.224) (0.155)
20.32 20.35 20.98 20.33 21.56
(13.22) (11.89) (11.71) (13.08) (13.06)
0.0711 0.0571 0.0647 0.0658 0.0490
(0.258) (0.233) (0.247) (0.248) (0.216)
1.879 1.788 1.713 1.795 1.761
(2.60) (2.53) (2.48) (2.57) (2.59)
18.94 15.94 13.44 18.23 14.91
(30.43) (25.59) (21.07) (32.13) (23.86)
67.41  63.76 62.07 64.96 61.59
(44.81) (46.01) (46.63) (45.58) (46.88)
23.89 22.35 21.25 22.77 21.88
(19.46) (19.64) (19.54) (19.53) (20.01)
3.47 3.19 3.08 3.31 3.23
(5.99) (5.92) (6.01) (5.94) (6.12)
6044 5185 5569
(2150) (1753) (2067)
0.0231 0.0175 0.0098
(0.075) (0.073) (0.031)
0.2308 0.4091 0.412 0.5 0.3421
(0.439) (0.503) (0.499) (0.522) (0.481)
13 15.39 13.29 8.69 10.46
(13.06) (22.70) (18.83) (7.99) (8.62)
0.1364 0.0588 0.1316
(0.351) (0.239) (0.343)
2.447 3.068 2.937 2.909 2.236
(2.26) (2.92) (2.90) (2.34) (2.37)
107.13 94.56 80.43 106.68 63.02
(188.29) (147.70) (123.09) (190.29) (120.04)
82.72 95.76 92.62 94.9 91.91
(28.52) (6.73)  (17.62)  (8.75) (18.07)
26.58 33.56 34.55 30.76 29.92
(13.58) (9.99) (11.70) (7.35) (12.19)
3.26 4.75 4.95 4.15 3.99
(4.20) (4.65) (4.41) (3.50) (4.09)
6709 5853 5860
(1379) (1003) (1212)
0.0194 0.0192 -0.0009
(0.037) (0.025) (0.035)
Entries in the table represent the means of the relevant variable. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The localities' monthly average wage and net
migration correspond to the year that preceded the elections; that is, 1995, 1998 and 2002 respectively. The monthly average wage is normalized using
the consumer price index with 2002 serving as the base year. Net migration is presented as a share of each locality's population.
Localities that suffered at least one terror fatality since the previous parliamentary elections
Localities that did not suffer terror fatalities since the previous parliamentary elections
00
Population (in thousands)
Percentage of Jewish Population
Monthly Average Wage (NIS)
Net Migration
Regional Capital
Table 4
Summary Statistics of Additional Covariates 
Population Density (thds. individuals / sq. km)
Population (in thousands)
Regional Capital
International Border
Distance to HB (km)
Percentage of Jewish Population
Monthly Average Wage (NIS)
Net Migration
Percentage of Immigrants from former Soviet Union
Percentage with Family Origin from Asia/Africa
Percentage of Immigrants from former Soviet Union
Percentage with Family Origin from Asia/Africa
Distance to HB (km)
International Border
Population Density (thds individuals / sq. km)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Locality's Fatalities within 3 months of the elections 0.0045 0.0023 0.0025 0.0021 0.0039 0.0022 0.0022 0.0018
(3.49) (2.36) (3.08) (3.21) (4.18) (2.63) (3.00) (3.00)
Total Terror Fatalities in Israel 0.0006 0.0006  0.0010 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004
(4.52) (4.18) (1.59) (3.68) (3.36) (0.64)
Regional Capital 0.1069 0.1162 0.0336 0.0487
(2.78) (3.08) (1.08) (1.40)
Distance to Home Base  -0.0017 -0.0013 0.0002 0.0005
(-2.16) (-1.62) (0.37) (0.94)
International Border  -0.1469 -0.1887 -0.0869 -0.1163
(-3.56) (-3.88) (-2.40) (-2.74)
Population Density (thds individuals per sq. km) 0.0211 0.0209 0.0099 0.0107
(3.28) (3.45) (1.51) (1.72)
Total Population (in thousands) -0.0014  -0.0013  -0.0004 -0.0004
(-4.39) (-4.72) (-1.93) (-1.72)
Percentage of Jewish Population 0.0014 0.0023 -0.0003 0.0003
(2.55) (3.30) (-0.80) (0.57)
Percentage with Family Origin from Asia/Africa 0.0077 0.0070 0.0107 0.0104
(7.35) (6.18) (14.08) (11.91)
Percentage of Immigrants from former Soviet Union 0.0059 0.0063 0.0083 0.0092
(4.34) (4.36) (6.02) (6.62)
Split Ticket Elections -0.0249 0.0136 -0.0238 -0.0249
(-5.87) (0.33) (-5.30) (-0.72)
Jerusalem 0.8404 0.8027 0.4538 0.4363
(5.44) (6.15) (4.74) (4.76)
Standard Deviation from National Average Wage -0.0230 -0.0118
(-1.28) (-1.04)
Net Migration -0.0938 -0.0547
(-0.60) (-0.32)
R
2 0.0030 0.0034 0.6120 0.6854 0.0023 0.0028 0.7026 0.7588
Number of Observations 1173 1173 1159 640 1058 1058 1046 585
Notes: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of a separate Ordinary least squares (OLS) panel regression model in which the dependent variable is the relative support for the right bloc of
parties. Robust t-statistics (adjusted for clustering at the locality level) are in parentheses. The regressions in columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) include locality fixed effects.
Full Sample Excluding Localities Occupied in 1967
Table 5
The Effect of Terror Fatalities on the Preferences of the Israeli Electorate(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Locality's Fatalities within 3 months of the elections -0.0052 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0041 0.0004 0.0003 0.0001
(-2.27) (0.13) (0.35) (0.81) (-2.29) (0.39) (0.35) (0.30)
Total Terror Fatalities in Israel -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0001 -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0003
(-20.95) (-21.46) (-0.59) (-19.60) (-20.01) (-1.13)
Regional Capital -0.0217 -0.0251 -0.0308 -0.0352
(-2.33) (-2.89) (-2.74) (-3.46)
Distance to Home Base  -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0009
(-2.64) (-3.61) (-1.71) (-2.63)
International Border  -0.0243 -0.0269 -0.0183 -0.0167
(-2.26) (-2.39) (-1.64) (-1.42)
Population Density (thds individuals per sq. km) 0.0006 0.0002 -0.0012 -0.0012
(0.44) (0.16) (-0.86) (-0.78)
Total Population (in thousands) -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002
(-4.12) (-3.96) (-2.74) (-2.61)
Percentage of Jewish Population 0.0014 0.0013 0.0012 0.0010
(8.80) (6.59) (7.53) (5.03)
Percentage with Family Origin from Asia/Africa -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0001
(-2.20) (-2.14) (-0.69) (-0.46)
Percentage of Immigrants from former Soviet Union -0.0034 -0.0041 -0.0030 -0.0036
(-4.95) (-6.06) (-4.36) (-5.27)
Split Ticket Elections 0.0216 0.0925 0.0215 0.0841
(7.14) (7.08) (6.55) (5.86)
Jerusalem 0.1752 0.1750 0.1269 0.1266
(3.81) (3.84) (2.96) (3.03)
Standard Deviation from National Average Wage 0.0060 0.0082
(1.31) (1.62)
Net Migration 0.1267 0.1660
(1.55) (2.13)
R
2 0.0022 0.1259 0.4344 0.5107 0.0024 0.1320 0.3875 0.4769
Number of Observations 1173 1173 1159 640 1058 1058 1046 585
Notes: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of a separate Ordinary least squares (OLS) panel regression model in which the dependent variable is the turnout rate. Robust t-statistics (adjusted
for clustering at the locality level) are in parentheses. The regressions in columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) include locality fixed effects.
Full Sample Excluding Localities Occupied in 1967
Table 6
The Effect of Terror Fatalities on the Turnout Rate of the Israeli Electorate0 0.7345 0.8021 0.8498
(All)  (Highest 75%) (Highest 50%) (Highest 25%)
Locality's Fatalities within 3 months of the elections 0.0025 0.0022 0.0075 0.0064
(3.08) (2.31) (2.68) (2.19)
Total Terror Fatalities in Israel 0.0006  0.0008 0.0008 0.0012
(4.18) (7.16) (4.27) (5.58)
R
2 0.6120 0.5736 0.5217 0.5503
Number of Observations 1159 871 579 290
Notes: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of a separate Ordinary least squares (OLS) panel regression model in which the
dependent variable is the relative support for the right bloc of parties. Each regression includes the same covariates presented in
Column 3 of Table 5.  Robust t-statistics (adjusted for clustering at the locality level) are in parentheses.
Table 7
The Effect of Terror Fatalities on the Preferences of the Israeli Electorate According to Localities' Turnout Rate
For localities with turnout rates above Full Sample
Excluding Localities Occupied 
in 1967
Locality's Fatalities within 3 months of the elections 0.0025 0.0025
(5.47) (5.79)
Total Terror Fatalities in Israel 0.0007 0.0007
(5.19) (4.54)
Right Incumbent 0.0267 0.0326
(4.56) (5.26)
Right Incumbent *  Local Fatalities -0.00003 -0.0004
(-0.02) (-0.27)
Regional Capital 0.1069 0.0336
(2.77) (1.08)
Distance to Home Base  -0.0017 0.0002
(-2.16) (0.36)
International Border  -0.1468 -0.0868
(-3.56) (-2.39)
Population Density (thds individuals per sq. km) 0.0211 0.0099
(3.28) (1.52)
Total Population (in thousands) -0.0014 -0.0004
(-4.39) (-1.92)
Percentage of Jewish Population 0.0014 -0.0003
(2.54) (-0.80)
Percentage with Family Origin from Asia/Africa 0.0077 0.0107
(7.35) (14.08)
Percentage of Immigrants from former Soviet Union 0.0059 0.0083
(4.34) (6.02)
Split Ticket Elections -0.0100 -0.0056
(-1.59) (-0.84)
Jerusalem 0.8401 0.4529
(5.40) (4.72)
R
2 0.6128 0.7038
Number of Observations 1159 1046
Notes: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of a separate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) panel regression model in which the
dependent variable is the relative support for the right bloc of political parties. Robust t-statistics (adjusted for clustering at the locality level)
are in parentheses.
Table 8
Testing for the Theory of Policy Voting versus the Theory of Partisan Voting0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
Locality's Fatalities within 3 months of the elections 0.0043 0.0203 0.0273 0.0278 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0009 0.0029
(3.67) (2.37) (2.39) (3.10) (-0.34) (0.19) (1.35) (1.16)
Total Terror Fatalities in Israel -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0011 0.0015 0.0014 0.0012 0.0009
(-1.86) (-3.79) (-4.90) (-6.10) (12.40) (12.72) (9.98) (7.00)
R
2 0.4410 0.3327 0.2709 0.2831 0.2052 0.3272 0.4364 0.5445
Number of Observations 588 481 397 307 571 438 308 173
Notes: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of a separate Ordinary least squares (OLS) panel regression model in which the dependent variable is the relative support for the
right bloc of parties. Each regression includes the same covariates presented in Column 3 of Table 5.  Robust t-statistics (adjusted for clustering at the locality level) are in parentheses.
For localities with a mean right-bloc vote share 
below
For localities with a mean right-bloc vote share 
above
Table 9
The Effect of Terror Fatalities on Localities According to their Electoral Preferences(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Locality's Terror Level within 3 months of the elections 0.0367 0.0148 0.0174 0.0158 0.0537 0.0220 0.0238  0.0216
(3.24) (1.88) (2.60) (1.79) (4.21) (1.96) (2.42) (2.36)
Total Terror Level in Israel 0.0036 0.0033 0.0113 0.0042 0.0037 0.0170
(7.62) (4.87) (1.59) (7.24) (4.96) (1.60)
Regional Capital 0.1062 0.1152 0.1062 0.1153
(2.76) (3.05) (2.75) (3.04)
Distance to Home Base  -0.0017 -0.0012 -0.0017 -0.0012
(-2.17) (-1.61) (-2.17) (-1.60)
International Border  -0.1471 -0.1891 -0.1473 -0.1894
(-3.56) (-3.87) (-3.56) (-3.86)
Population Density (thds individuals per sq. km) 0.0210 0.0208 0.0201 0.0208
(3.28) (3.43) (3.28) (3.43)
Total Population (in thousands) -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0012
(-4.39) (-4.68) (-4.39) (-4.65)
Percentage of Jewish Population 0.0014 0.0023 0.0013 0.0023
(2.54) (3.30) (2.54) (3.30)
Percentage with Family Origin from Asia/Africa 0.0077 0.0070 0.0077 0.0070
(7.36) (6.18) (7.36) (6.17)
Percentage of Immigrants from former Soviet Union 0.0060 0.0063 0.0060 0.0063
(4.35) (4.35) (4.35) (4.35)
Split Ticket Elections -0.0066 0.1284 -0.0107 0.1686
(-0.96) (1.14) (-1.74) (1.23)
Jerusalem 0.8441 0.8058 0.8420 0.8014
(5.42) (6.12) (5.41) (6.06)
Standard Deviation from National Average Wage -0.0229 -0.0230
(-1.68) (-1.68)
Net Migration -0.0936 -0.0923
(-0.59) (-0.58)
R
2 0.0078 0.0059 0.6129 0.6854 0.0065 0.0058 0.6128 0.6854
Number of Observations 1173 1173 1159 640 1173 1173 1159 640
Notes: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of a separate Ordinary least squares (OLS) panel regression model in which the dependent variable is the relative support for the right bloc of
parties. Robust t-statistics (adjusted for clustering at the locality level) are in parentheses. The regressions in columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) include locality fixed effects.
Measuring Terror using Attacks Measuring Terror using an Indicator for Localities Attacked
Table 10
The Effect of Terrorism on the Preferences of the Israeli ElectorateFull Sample
Excluding Localities 
Occupied in 1967
Full Sample
Excluding Localities 
Occupied in 1967
Full Sample
Excluding Localities 
Occupied in 1967
Locality's Fatalities within 3 months of the elections 0.0024 0.0022 0.0031 0.0029 0.0025 0.0020
(3.05) (2.96) (2.01) (1.79) (3.10) (2.66)
Total Terror Fatalities in Israel 0.0005 0.0004 0.0009 0.0008 0.0007 0.0006
(3.90) (3.07) (6.65) (5.73) (4.64) (3.91)
Regional Capital 0.1052 0.0309 0.1209 0.0429 0.1042 0.0275
(2.68) (0.98) (3.14) (1.46) (2.72) (0.85)
Distance to Home Base  -0.0018 0.0002 -0.0018 0.0002 -0.0010 0.0009
(-2.23) (0.28) (-2.33) (0.49) (-1.35) (1.52)
International Border  -0.1468 -0.0865 -0.1432 -0.0789 -0.1624 -0.1012
(-3.57) (-2.39) (-3.54) (-2.24) (-4.17) (-2.87)
Population Density (thds individuals per sq. km) 0.0213 0.0101 0.0194 0.0075 0.0211 0.0096
(3.29) (1.52) (3.35) (1.54) (3.24) (1.45)
Total Population (in thousands) -0.0014 -0.0004 -0.0015 -0.0004 -0.0013 -0.0003
(-4.36)  (-1.93) (-4.74) (-2.50) (-4.31) (-1.62)
Percentage of Jewish Population 0.0014 -0.0003 0.0018 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0015
(2.53) (-0.87) (3.36) (0.04) (0.36) (-4.02)
Percentage with Family Origin from Asia/Africa 0.0078 0.0108 0.0064 0.0096 0.0076 0.0107
(7.43) (14.36) (5.98) (12.81) (7.27) (14.04)
Percentage of Immigrants from former Soviet Union 0.0047 0.0071 0.0061 0.0087 0.0059 0.0083
(3.43) (5.14) (4.36) (6.49) (4.43) (6.21)
Split Ticket Elections -0.0376 -0.0374 -0.0459 -0.0460 -0.0283 -0.0275
(-9.55) (-9.03) (-9.71) (-9.12) (-5.34) (-4.82) \
Jerusalem 0.8492 0.4589 0.8082 0.3928 0.8026 0.4052
(5.40) (4.76) (5.35) (4.97) (5.26) (4.25)
R
2 0.6105 0.7028 0.6076 0.7108 0.4961 0.6073
Number of Observations 1159 1046 1159 1046 1159 1046
Notes: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of a separate Ordinary least squares (OLS) panel regression model. In the first two columns the dependent variable is the relative support for the right bloc
of parties excluding the Russian party. In the two middle columns the dependent variable is the relative support for the right bloc of parties excluding the ultra orthodox parties. In the last two columns the
dependent variable is the relative support for the right bloc of parties excluding the Arab parties. Robust t-statistics (adjusted for clustering at the locality level) are in parentheses.
Table 11
The Effect of Terror Fatalities on the Preferences of the Israeli Electorate for Alternative Definitions of Relative Right-Bloc Vote Share
Excluding the Russian Parties Excluding the Ultra Orthodox Parties Excluding the Arab Parties(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
- 3 months of the elections 0.0025 0.0022
(3.08) (3.00)
- 6 months of the elections 0.0016 0.0014
(3.74) (4.22)
- one year of the elections 0.0014 0.0014
(3.01) (2.90)
- since the previous elections 0.0012 0.0012
(3.22) (3.07)
Total Terror Fatalities in Israel 0.0006  0.0003 0.0001 0.00007 0.0005 0.0003 0.0001 0.00006
(4.18) (4.24) (4.70) (4.39) (3.36) (3.43) (4.01) (3.70)
0.1069 0.1070 0.1062 0.1050 0.0336 0.0336 0.0329 0.0319
(2.78) (2.78) (2.76) (2.73) (1.08) (1.08) (1.05) (1.02)
-0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0017 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
(-2.16) (-2.16) (-2.15) (-2.15) (0.37) (0.37) (0.38) (0.38)
-0.1469 -0.1470 -0.1469 -0.1467 -0.0869 -0.0870 -0.0870 -0.0869
(-3.56) (-3.58) (-3.57) (-3.56) (-2.40) (-2.41) (-2.40) (-2.40)
0.0211 0.0210 0.0211 0.0211 0.0099 0.0099 0.0100 0.0101
(3.28) (3.28) (3.29) (3.30) (1.51) (1.51) (1.52) (1.53)
-0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0014  -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004
(-4.39) (-4.38) (-4.41) (-4.52) (-1.93) (-1.91) (-1.97) (-2.07)
0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
(2.55) (2.55) (2.54) (2.54) (-0.80) (-0.80) (-0.81) (-0.80)
Percentage with Family Origin from Asia/Africa 0.0077 0.0077 0.0077 0.0077 0.0107 0.0107 0.0107 0.0107
(7.35) (7.36) (7.37) (7.38) (14.08) (14.09) (14.10) (14.09)
Percentage of Immigrants from former Soviet Union 0.0059 0.0059 0.0059 0.0060 0.0083 0.0083 0.0083 0.0083
(4.34) (4.33) (4.34) (4.37) (6.02) (6.01) (6.03) (6.05)
-0.0249 -0.0254 -0.0194 -0.0235 -0.0238 -0.0243 -0.0185 -0.0223
(-5.87) (-6.11) (-3.98) (-5.39) (-5.30) (-5.52) (-3.53) (-4.84)
0.8404 0.8320 0.8208 0.8122 0.4538 0.4465 0.4333 0.4266
(5.44) (5.38) (5.26) (5.36) (4.74) (4.66) (4.49) (4.46)
0.6120 0.6121 0.6131 0.6135 0.7026 0.7028 0.7035 0.7032
1159 1159 1159 1159 1046 1046 1046 1046
R
2
Number of Observations
Notes: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of a separate Ordinary least squares (OLS) panel regression model in which the dependent variable is the relative support for the right 
bloc of parties. Robust t-statistics (adjusted for clustering at the locality level) are in parentheses.  
Total Population (in thousands)
Percentage of Jewish Population
Jerusalem
Split Ticket Elections
Full Sample Excluding Localities Occupied in 1967
Table 12
The Effect of Terror Fatalities on Electoral Preferences using Different Time Spans to Measure Terror Fatalities
Population Density (thds individuals per sq. km)
Locality's Fatalities within:
Regional Capital
Distance to Home Base 
International Border 1988 1992 1996 1999 2003
Right Bloc Share 1.686 1.9089 2.0057 1.3786 -0.5178
(0.95) (1.79) (1.03) (0.77) (-0.27)
[0.797] [0.893] [0.905] [0.629] [-0.264]
Pseudo R-squared 0.5544 0.624 0.6794 0.4505 0.725
Number of Observations 224 232 235 240 242
1988 1992 1996 1999 2003
Right Bloc Share 0.0644 0.7071 -1.8364 -3.5752 -3.9709
(0.06) (0.59) (-0.71) (-1.51) (-2.82)
[0.028] [0.303] [-0.750] [-1.500] [-1.855]
Pseudo R-squared 0.6134 0.6675 0.773 0.5528 0.8098
Number of Observations 203 209 212  216 218
Notes: Each column presents the coefficients from separate Poisson regressions where the dependent variable is the
number of terror fatalities between two successive national parliamentary elections starting on the date of the election
indicated in the column’s title and the independent variables are as specified in model (2) above. Robust t-statistics are in
parentheses. Elasticities evaluated at the means appear in brackets.
Table 13
Testing for Reverse Causality
 Full Sample
Excluding Localities Occupied in 19671988 1992 1996 1999 2003
2,283,123 2,616,841 2,973,580 3,309,416 3,148,364
18,563 20,715 24,779 25,936 25,138
17,134 34,865 33,008 17,772 164,601
45,936 85,825 127,490 53,765 239,264
Overall Increase in Support for Right Bloc due to 
Terrorism
Table 14
A Calibration of the Impact of Terrorism on the Israeli Parliamentary Elections
Note: The Number of Ballots and Number of Votes per Mandate were obtained from the official statistics published at the official website of the Israeli Parliament (www.knesset.gov.il). The magnitudes in
rows 3 and 4 were calibrated using the estimated coefficients on the effects of terrorism on the support for the right bloc of parties weighted by each locality's population.
Number of Valid Ballots
Number of Votes per Mandate
Increase in Support for Right Bloc due to Terrorism 
within 3 Months of the Elections